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PROPERTY LAW-Not So Fast: The Supreme Court's Overly Broad
Public Use Ruling Condemns Private Property Rights with Surprising
Results. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
INTRODUCTION

The City of New London is located in the southeastern part of Connecticut where the Thames River empties into Long Island Sound.' In 1978,
the city created the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a nonprofit organization, to help assist in planning economic growth.2 The decades following creation of the NLDC, however, proved to be a period of
economic decline for New London, particularly in the Fort Trumbull area of
the city.3 The decline was so dramatic that New London was labeled a "distressed municipality" by a state agency in 1990.' Adding to this deterioration, in 1996 the Federal Government closed the United States Naval Undersea Warfare Center, located in the Fort Trumbull area, which had employed
over 1500 people.5 By 1998, this closure had contributed to an unemployment rate in New London twice as large as that in the rest of Connecticut.6
The same year, the NLDC was revitalized in order to focus on the need for
economic rejuvenation and development in the New London community of
Fort Trumbull. 7 In a coincidental stroke of good luck, Pfizer, Inc. simultaneously announced its plan to develop a research site adjacent to the Fort
Trumbull area.8 New London officially conveyed land to Pfizer in June of
1998.' The next month, the City appointed consultants in order to begin the
development plan and the state Environmental Protection Act process.'0

I.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005), aff'g 843 A.2d 500
(Conn. 2004).
2.
Id. at 2659; Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 (Conn. 2004).
3.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
4.
Id. The state office of policy and management labeled New London a "distressed
municipality." Kelo. 843 A.2d at 510.
5.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. See also Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
6.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
7.
Id. at 2658-59.
8.
Id. at 2659. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508. In January of 1998, the state issued $5.35
million in bonds to help fund development activities and a $10 million bond to fund a Fort
Trumbull State Park. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. Pfizer, a large pharmaceutical company,
announced its plan for a research facility in February of 1998. Id.
9.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508. Pfizer purchased the New London Mills site. Id.
10.
Id. at 508-09. Environmental impact evaluations, including any negative findings:
[S]hall be submitted for comment and review to the Council on Environmental Quality, the Department of Environmental Protection, the Connecticut Commission on Culture and Tourism, the Office of Policy and
Management, the Department of Economic and Community Development
in the case of a proposed action that affects existing housing, and other
appropriate agencies, and to the town clerk of each municipality affected
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The NLDC included many purposes in their economic development
plan." In particular, the plan stated the new Fort Trumbull development
should create jobs, increase tax revenue for New London, and help drive the
revitalization of the city's downtown growth by taking advantage of the new
Pfizer facility. 12 An additional purpose included the creation of a more attractive city and increased public access to recreation. 3 The NLDC produced six plans and finally settled on a plan that was approved by the city
council in January 2000."' The approved plan encompassed ninety acres of
Fort Trumbull and was divided into seven parcels. 5 The development was
projected to create an abundance of new jobs and greatly increase the tax
base. 6 After authorizing the NLDC's plan, the city council conferred its
eminent domain power on the NLDC to purchase or condemn the proposed
property. 7 By November of 2000, the NLDC had successfully purchased
the majority of land needed for development.' However, the owners of fif-

thereby, and shall be made available to the public for inspection and
comment at the same time.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-ld (2004).
1!.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
12.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
13.
Id.
14.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510. The plans developed but not accepted included the following:
(1) no action, assuming that the United States Navy would initiate some sort of development
plan; (2) recreational and cultural facilities to accompany the nearby state park; (3) new residential construction with few retail stores and office spaces; (4) a business campus with hotel
and conference center; and (5) two mixed use alternates combining residences, recreational,
commercial, hotel and retail uses. Id. at 510 n.6. The city council approved a sixth alternative after review by state agencies and meetings with the public to explain the process of
development. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
15.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. The parcels were given the following designations: (Parcel
1) waterfront conference hotel with restaurants, shopping, marinas for recreational and commercial use, and the origination of a riverwalk connecting all waterfront areas of the development; (Parcel 2) eighty new residences and a United States Coast Guard Museum; (Parcel
3) 90,000 square feet of research and development office space (this parcel is located adjacent
to Pfizer's plant); (Parcel 4A) parking or retail which is attached to the new state park; (Parcel
4B) renovated marina and end of river walk; and (Parcels 5, 6, and 7) office and retail space,
parking, and water-dependant commercial uses. Id. at 2559.
16.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510. The approved plan was expected to create between 518 and
867 construction jobs; between 718 and 1362 direct jobs; and between 500 and 940 indirect
jobs. Id. These new jobs would more than compensate for the jobs lost by the closing of the
Naval Underwater Warfare Center. Id. The development plan would generate between
$680,544 and $1,249,843 in new property taxes for the City of New London. Id.
17.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. This power of eminent domain was conferred on the NLDC
by Connecticut General Statute § 8-193 which states "[t]he development agency may, with
the approval of the legislative body, and in the name of the municipality, acquire by eminent
domain real property located within the project area and real property and interest therein for
rights-of-way and other easements to and from the project area." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
8-193 (2004).
18.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
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teen remaining properties were unwilling to sell and the NLDC began the
condemnation process to acquire the remaining land. 9
In an effort to avoid losing their properties, the nine remaining property owners filed an action in New London Superior Court in December
2000.20 They claimed that the taking of their properties was not in accordance with the "public use" restriction of the Fifth Amendment.2 The Court
granted a permanent restraining order with respect to the properties likely to
be used as a parking lot in parcel 4A, but offered no relief with respect to the
properties destined for office space in parcel 3.2" Both the City of New London and plaintiffs appealed claiming the trial court erred in its judgment.23
The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the office space takings in parcel
3 and reversed the superior court's ruling for a restraining order in the parking lot area of parcel 4A.24
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine
whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic de25
velopment satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stevens, the Court affirmed the ruling
of the Supreme Court of Connecticut holding that the proposed takings in
Fort Trumbull serve a public purpose and therefore qualify as a public use
under the Fifth Amendment.26

19.
Id. Four of the properties were in parcel 3 of the development (reserved as office
space to complement the Pfizer facility) and the remaining eleven properties were in parcel
4A (likely to be used as a parking lot). Id. at 2659-60. The nine property owners unwilling to
sell were not holding out for more money nor were they against development in Fort Trumbull. Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, they believed New London's purpose
for condemning their properties was not a valid "public use." Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
20.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. See also Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002
Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
21.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2660. These properties were not blighted, but were condemned as
a result of their location within the development area. Id.
22.
Id. Parcel 4A contained eleven properties and parcel 3 contained four properties. Id.
23.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508. Plaintiffs claimed the trial court erred by concluding (1)the
taking was valid under chapter 132 of the Connecticut General Statutes; (2) economic development is a valid public use and these takings will benefit the public and assure of future
public use; (3) giving the eminent domain power to the development corporation was not
unconstitutional; (4) that the takings in parcel 3 were reasonably necessary to the development plan; and (5) that allowing a private social club on the property in parcel 3 but not allowing it on plaintiff's property was not a violation of equal protection of the laws. Id. Defendants claim the trial court erred by concluding (I) the takings of the properties in 4A were
not reasonably necessary to accomplish the development plan; and (2) the city's general
power to widen and alter roadways did not justify the takings in parcel 4A. Id.
24.
Id. at 574. The Connecticut Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court "with
direction to render judgment for the defendants." Id.
25.by Law
Kelo,
125 S.of
Ct.Wyoming
at 2661. Scholarship, 2006
Published
Archive
3
26.
Id. at 2657, 2665, 2669.
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This case note will examine the evolving definition of "public use"
under the Fifth Amendment. First, it will trace the broadening definition of
public use and legislative deference leading up to Kelo, which this case note
will argue was decided incorrectly. Next, it will analyze the Court's precedents and argue that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut
could have been reversed without their disruption. Additionally, it will argue that, ultimately, the decision puts the economically and politically disadvantaged at risk of losing their land to developers who wish to profit by
building strip malls and nice hotels in place of homes and small businesses.
Last, although the Kelo decision has some disturbing consequences, this case
note will argue that backlash from this decision has raised public awareness
and started a movement for legislation that will ultimately limit the government's eminent domain power.
BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that
no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shallprivateproperty be taken for public use, withoutjust compensation."27 There are three categories of takings which justify the "public
use" clause, two of them more straight-forward than the other.28 The first
type of taking, premised on the most obvious type of public use, occurs
when the government takes land from private entities in order to use it for a
school, road, military facility, or hospital.29 Essentially, the "public" or the
government owns the property.30 A second type of taking occurs when private property is transferred to private owners of a common carrier or utility." This type of taking, although transferred to a private entity, allows the
public equal access to the service it provides.32 The third, a more controversial and confusing type of taking, involves the transfer of private land to a
private entity that will ultimately serve a "public purpose."3 3 It is this third
type of taking that was commonly rejected throughout the nineteenth cenU.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
27.
28.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269
29.
U.S. 55 (1925) (allowing the United States to take private land for military facilities); Rindge
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (allowing the state of California to take
private property for the creation of a public highway).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
31.
Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992) (allowing the taking of property for use by a railroad); Mt.
Vemon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916) (transferring private water rights to a power company to generate power).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (allowing
33.
transfer of private property to a private developer in order to eradicate the conditions causing
slums); Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (transferring fee simple title

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
from lessor to lessee in order to break up a land oligopoly causing a skewed land market).
See infra notes 36-76 and accompanying text.
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tury, but has become increasingly widespread in recent years.34 Although
there are many cases leading to the decision in Kelo v. City of New London,
two cases, Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
greatly contributed to the Court's justification for its ruling.35
Redevelopment Due to Blight
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided Berman v.
Parker, in which it upheld the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of
1945.36 The Act involved takings for the purpose of "slum clearing" and
found that conditions in parts of Washington, D.C. were so substandard they
were "injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare" of the people of the Nation's capital.37 This Act gave the government the power to
eliminate harmful conditions by any "means necessary and appropriate for
the purpose," including acquiring and assembling, "by eminent domain and
otherwise, real property for 'the redevelopment of blighted territory in the
District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting factors or causes of blight.""'3 In 1950, the District of Columbia attempted the first redevelopment project under the Act.3 9 According to the
Planning Commission, many of the residences in Area B were beyond repair
and lacked electricity, indoor toilets, wash basins, or central heating.4" Due
34.
See Eric R. Claeys, Symposium: The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Public-Use Limitations
and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 877, 904-05 (Winter 2004). In the
nineteenth century, "courts routinely rejected-in extremely strong language-the proposition
that legislatures could redistribute land between private parties," but modem law treats "public use" as "public usefulness," a much broader term. Id.
35.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984). See also Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923) (allowing the condemnation of private land for use as a railroad tunnel); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281
U.S. 439 (1930) (disallowing greater appropriation of land than needed for the widening of a
city street); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (overruling a previous decision allowing takings to confer benefits on private entities); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (allowing condemnation of
private land in order to transfer it to a large private corporation); Daniels v. Area Plan
Comm'n of Allen County, 306 F.3d 445 (2002) (prohibiting the vacation of a restrictive
covenant which would have resulted in the taking of residential property in order to confer a
benefit on developers).
36.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 36.
37.
Id. at 28. See D.C. CODE §§ 5-701-5-719 (1951) ("[I]t is hereby declared to be the

policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of
the Government by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose.").
38.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28, 29 (quoting D.C. CODE §§ 5-701-5-719 (1951)).
39.
Id. at 30. Due to overwhelming blight, "[t]he first project undertaken under the Act
relates to Project Area B in Southwest Washington, D.C." Id.
40.
Id. "Surveys revealed that in Area B, 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair,
18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had outsideby
toilets,
60.3% had
baths, 29.3%
Published
Law Archive
of no
Wyoming
Scholarship,
2006 82.2% had no wash basins or laun- 5
lacked electricity,
dry tubs, 83.8% lacked central heating." Id.
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to these conditions, the District's Director of Health declared it "necessary"
to redevelop that area in order to protect the public's health.4' Thus, the necessary steps were taken to assemble the land in the area for redevelopment.4 2
After the land was assembled, some of it would be transferred to public entities for the construction of schools, streets, and utilities.43 However, the majority of the land would be sold or leased to private developers because preference was given to private entities over public agencies.44
Berman, a department store owner whose non-blighted property was
located inside Area B, objected to the taking of his land, in part, because it
was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. 45 Berman contended that taking his property and transferring it to a private entity was not
a valid "public use." 46
The Supreme Court upheld the Redevelopment Act, allowing the
taking of Berman's property.47 The Court articulated two reasons for its
holding.48 First and foremost, the Berman Court deferred to the legislature's
judgment as to whether to exercise its police power over the affairs of the
District of Columbia.49 Traditionally, a government may enact its police
powers for matters of public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet,
and law and order.5" The Court stated the legislature's job is to determine
how to use these powers, and the judiciary's job is to decide whether the
police power is being used for a public use.5 Second, the Court stated the
use of eminent domain is only a means to the end which Congress has proposed.52 Thus, once Congress has proposed the removal of blight, it is
within Congress' authority to determine which means will achieve this
41.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. The development plan specified that at least one-third of the new homes were to
be low rent. Id.
44.
Id. However, the leases and sales required private developers to conform to the specific, authorized development plan. Id.
45.
Id. at 31. The redevelopment plan called for the transfer of Berman's unblighted
department store to private developers, for their benefit, because it was located inside the
development area. Id.
46.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. Plaintiff argued that "[t]o take for the purpose of ridding the
area of slums is one thing; it is quite another, the argument goes, to take a man's property
merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive community." Id.
47.
Id. at 36 ("If the Agency considers it necessary in carrying out the redevelopment
project to take full title to the real property involved, it may do so.").
48.
Id. at 32-33.
49.
Id. at 31-32 ("[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs to be served by social legislation ....
50.
Id. at 32.
51.
Id. (concluding that the judiciary's power to determine public use is extremely narrow).
52.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. The Court explained that "[o]nce the object is within the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine." Id.
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goal." The Court rejected the notion that the only method to achieve a public purpose is by public ownership, and found "private enterprise" may better
serve the needs of the public and facilitate Congress' purpose.54
Although Berman's land was not blighted, experts stated that in order for the community to be redeveloped in such a way as to avoid future
blight, the whole area had to be redesigned. 5" The Court agreed, concluding
that the Constitution does not force redevelopment programs to be on a lotby-lot basis.56 The Berman Court laid the groundwork for future cases involving the use of eminent domain for transfer of private land to private entities by stating:
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary
line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project
area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the
project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative
branch. 7
Thus, the Berman Court concluded that courts should give deference to the
legislature when determining what constitutes a public purpose and in determining the means to realize it. 8
Takings ConferringPrivateBenefits
Thirty years after the decision in Berman, the United States Supreme
Court, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, was given another chance to
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 33-34. Although Berman argued the taking of his property was merely the
transfer of a benefit from one businessman to the other, the Court said ultimately, the interest
of the public might be served best through a private entity. Id. at 33-34.
55.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 34. The Court concluded that Congress looked at the best interest of the entire community and, even if individual properties in the community were not
blighted, they were to be condemned in the interest of the community as a whole. Id.
Id. at 35. The Court stated,
56.
The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan
could be developed for the region, including not only new homes but also
schools, churches, parks, streets and shopping centers. In this way it was
hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be controlled and the birth
of future slums prevented.
Id. at 34-35.
57.
Id. at 35-36 (referencing Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); U.S.
ex. rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 554 (1946); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230,
Published247
by(1946)).
Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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decide the issue of whether economic development constitutes a "public
purpose."59 The Midkiff Court unanimously affirmed Berman.' By the late
1960s, the State of Hawaii had tried various methods to break up a land oligopoly plaguing Hawaii's residential land market. 6 The legislature had
determined the ownership of the majority of land by only a few citizens was
"inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare." 2 The
Hawaii Legislature attempted to compel the large land owners to sell their
property to their lessees.63 However, the landowners largely rejected this
proposal claiming they would have sold, not leased, their property years ago
had federal taxes not been so burdensome upon the occurrence of a sale."
In an effort to appease the landowners and eliminate the oligopoly, the Hawaii Legislature passed the Land Reform Act of 1967.5 Among various
restrictions, the Act allowed current lessees of property to petition the government to condemn their land in order to relieve the seller of high taxes and
promote a friendlier housing market.66
In 1977, the lessees of Midkiff's land began the process to procure
the property on which they lived.6 7 The Hawaii Housing Authority determined that these takings would further the purpose of the Land Reform Act
and ordered Midkiff to negotiate a selling price with his lessees.6 When
these negotiations failed, instead of submitting to compulsory arbitration,
Midkiff filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii claiming that the Land Reform Act was unconstitutional.69 Like the
Berman Court, the district court in Midkiff held that the Act's goals were
within the bounds of Hawaii's police power.70 Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision.7 The court of
appeals, using strict scrutiny, determined the purpose of the Land Reform

59.
60.
61.

Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 230, 244.
Id. at 232. The oligopoly stemmed from a feudal land system created by Polynesian

immigrants in which there was no private ownership of land. Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 233.
Id.
64.
65.
Id. at 233. See HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 516-22 (1977) (giving the Hawaii Housing Authority the power of eminent domain if, after a public hearing, the proposed takings are determined to be a valid public purpose).
66.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233-34. The federal tax burden was lessened by making the sales
"involuntary." Id. at 233.
67.
Id. at 234.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 234-35.
70.
Id. at 235 (holding that the means which the legislature chose to eliminate the oligophttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
oly were not "arbitrary, capricious, or selected in bad faith").
71.
Id. at 235. See Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Act was not a public use and the Act was simply a way to transfer land from
one person to another.72
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court not only affirmed
Berman, but stated that regulating an oligopoly is included in the State's
police powers. The Court concluded that eminent domain could be used to
achieve any purpose falling under the government's police power.74 Again,
the Court promoted a rational basis review of eminent domain for economic
development, giving almost complete deference to the legislature.7 5 Despite
the fact that neither the legislature nor the public would have access to the
taken land, the Midkiff Court concluded "[a] purely private taking could not
withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void. But no purely private taking is involved in these cases."76
StrikingDown Economic Development as a Public Use
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit and County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, both Supreme Court of Michigan cases, addressed opposing views of takings for private benefits. 77 The early 1980s found Michigan, particularly Detroit, in a state of economic peril resulting from a mass
exodus of manufacturers.
In 1980, General Motors threatened to leave
Detroit unless the city could find a suitable location for a new plant. 79 Due
72.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235, 243 (holding by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the
takings in Midkiff were not similar to those previously held to constitute a "public use").
73.
Id. at 242 ("Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise
of a State's police powers.").
74.
Id. at 240-41. The Court stated that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id. at 240.
75.
Id. at 242-43. The Court stated that "[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate
and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom
of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts." Id.
76.
Id. at 245.
77.
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981);
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
78.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that the increased cost of
doing business was driving automobile manufacturers out of the state).
79.
Id. at 466 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
[There was an] offer from General Motors to construct a modem 3 million
square foot assembly complex at a cost of $500,000,000 to replace their
aging Cadillac Assembly and Fisher Body plants that General Motors
propose[d] to close in 1983. To Detroit, this provided the opportunity to
retain 6,150 jobs which would have otherwise been permanently lost to
the Detroit area if General Motors were forced by size constraints to
move ....

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
Id. at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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to the high level of distress Detroit would face if another of its manufacturers left, the State of Michigan enacted the Economic Development Corporations Act. 0 The Act gave Detroit the power to condemn private land in order to transfer it to General Motors for construction of a new facility.8 I Although plaintiffs agreed with the purpose of the Act, they challenged the use
of eminent domain to transfer private property to a private entity in the name
of economic development. 82 In a very short opinion, the Michigan Supreme
Court referred to Berman when it deferred to the legislature and upheld the
takings.83 The Poletown court used heightened scrutiny for a taking that
benefits private entities." This heightened scrutiny was used in order to
ensure that the "public interest is the predominant interest being advanced."" Although Poletown used heightened scrutiny, it upheld the taking
of residents' private property in order to benefit a private company. 6
Twenty-three years later, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the
Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletown in order to "protect people's
property rights, and preserve the legitimacy of the judicial branch as expositor-not creator-of fundamental law."8" This case involved a county wishing to condemn private property under the guise of eminent domain in order
to construct a 1300 acre business and technology park. 8 The purpose of this
taking was to rejuvenate a struggling economy, but the Michigan Supreme
Court struck it down as inconsistent with the term "public use" found in the
Michigan Constitution. 9 When deciding Kelo, the United States Supreme
80.
Id. at 457. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 125.1601 (1979) (authorizing municipalities to
condemn land in order to provide for industrial and commercial sites).
81.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457. The Court stated that "the Legislature has authorized
municipalities to acquire property by condemnation in order to provide industrial and commercial sites and the means of transfer from the municipality to private users." Id. at 458.
82.
Id. at 458. The purpose of the Act was to "create an industrial site which will be used
to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress." Id.
83.
Id. at 459 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)) ("The United States
Supreme Court has held that when the legislature speaks, the public interest has been declared
in terms 'well-nigh conclusive."').
84.
Id. at 459-60.
85.
Id. at 459-60. In order to ensure the public interest, "[s]uch public benefit cannot be
speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant if it is to be within the legitimate
purpose as stated by the Legislature." Id. at 460.
86.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460. See Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituaryfor Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 651, 661 (Spring 2005)
(explaining that the court's decision in Poletown did not conform with strict scrutiny).
87.
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
88.
ld. at 769.
89.
Id. at 770. The court determined that in Michigan there are three categories of condemnation that qualify as public use. Id. at 781. The categories include the following: (1)
public necessity such as the need for railroads or highways; (2) condemning in order to transfer land to a private entity when that private entity remains accountable to the public for use
of that property; and (3) when the land being condemned is of a public concern such as in the
case of eliminating blight. Id. at 781-83. The court concluded that "Wayne County intends to
transfer the condemned properties to private parties in a manner wholly inconsistent with the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
common understanding of 'public use' at the time our Constitution was ratified." 1d. at 770.
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Court was armed with the knowledge that at least one state had unanimously
and recently rejected the taking of private property for economic development. 9°
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Kelo v. City of New London, the United States Supreme Court determined whether economic development qualifies as a public use under the
Fifth Amendment. 91 The Court's decision began by stating that the government will never be justified in taking land from private property owner A to
give to private property owner B for his sole benefit, but the government is
allowed to transfer property from A to B if the purpose of the taking is for
future use by the public. 92 The Court reasoned that giving A's land to B for
the sole benefit of B will never withstand the public use requirement. 93 In
order to qualify as a public use, private property may be given to another
private owner only if the purpose is to benefit the public.94 However, the
property may not be transferred under the pretext of a public use when the
actual purpose of the taking is to confer a private benefit on a particular
group. 95 The Kelo Court concurred with both lower court opinions in that
the economic development plan is a legitimate purpose that will not just confer a benefit on an identifiable group of people. 96
The Court accepted the purpose of the proposed takings, but it acknowledged the fact that the condemned land will not be required to be open
to the public.97 However, the Court "long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public."98 The
Court used the modem definition of public use in declaring that Kelo does

90.
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
91.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). The Court declared that "[t]he
question presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a
'public use' within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 2658.
92.
Id. at 2661.
93.
Id. See Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (explaining that a
purely private taking is not a public use because it does not serve a legitimate government
purpose); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (explaining that it is beyond reason and
justice that people would entrust the legislature to take property from A and give it to B).
94.
Kelo. 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
95.
Id. at 2661.
96.
Id. at 2662. The record clearly states that the purpose of the plan was not to benefit
Pfizer but to revitalize the community as a whole. Id. at 2662 n.6. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
245 (stating that the Act in question was not for the benefit of an identifiable individual).
Published 97.
by LawKelo,
Archive
of Wyoming
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98.
Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
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not turn on whether the development plan is a public use but whether it
serves a public purpose. 99
The Court then evaluated whether economic development constitutes a public purpose, relying heavily on the outcomes of two United States
Supreme Court cases decided within the last half of the twenty-first century,
Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff '00 As previously mentioned, the Court in both cases upheld the condemnation of property taken from private property owners and transferred to private individu10
als. '
In Kelo, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Connecticut.'0 2 The Court deferred to the judgment of the Connecticut legislature which determined that the Fort Trumbull area was distressed enough to
warrant economic rejuvenation.'0 3 The Court agreed the economic development plan will create a "whole greater than the sum of its parts" with new
jobs and increased tax revenue, among other things. 4 In finalizing its decision, the Court determined that it must look at the development plan in its
entirety, not the claim of each individual property owner.'05
Before concluding its discussion, the Court addressed three of the
petitioners' contentions."° First, the Court rejected petitioners' argument
that economic development does not constitute a public use by stating that
"economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic
0 7
development from the other public purposes that we have recognized."'
99.
Id. at 2662. Compared to the mid-nineteenth century when courts defined public use
as "use by the public," the more modem use evolved into "public purpose," a much broader
term. Id.
100. Id. at 2663-64 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Housing Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
101. Id. After describing the facts and holdings of Berman and Midkiff the Court concluded that "[flor more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining
what public needs justify the use of the takings power." Id. at 2664.
102. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669.
103. Id. at 2665. The Court deferred to the legislature's judgment despite the fact the City
of New London was not faced with blight removal. Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id. The Court reaffirmed that "it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve
the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the
entire plan." Id.
106.
Id. at 2665-68.
107.
Id. at 2665. The Court recognized the importance of agriculture and mining to the
public in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. 200 U.S. 527 (1906). Id. In Berman,
the Court recognized the importance of a "well-balanced" community. Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954). In Midkiff, the Court recognized that breaking up a land oligopoly was
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
important to the proper functioning of the real estate market. Haw. Housing. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984).
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The Court refused to exempt economic development from being a public
purpose." 8 Second, the Court rejected the argument that labeling economic
development a public use is blurring the lines between public and private
takings.109 While the Court recognized developers and other private individuals will benefit from the development plan in Fort Trumbull, it contended that, in actuality, a public purpose may be best served by private individuals."' Again, the Court deferred to the legislature to make this determination.'
Last, the Court rejected petitioners' recommendations that the
Court require a "reasonable certainty" the public will benefit from the takings. ' The Court contended that a "reasonable certainty" test would depart
from precedent in Midk'ff which established that as long as the legislative
purpose is legitimate and the means to that purpose are not irrational, it is
not for the Court to debate the wisdom of the taking." 3 In addition, the
Court believed that the delay required to confirm this "reasonable certainty"
would jeopardize the chance of economic success." 4 Thus, the Court determined the only thing it must decide was whether the legislature's purpose
was legitimate and whether there was a rational relation between the purpose
of the act and the means used to achieve it." 5 In response to both inquiries,
the Court decided in the affirmative." 6
The Kelo Court concluded by noting that "nothing in our opinion
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the

108.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-66.
109.
Id. at 2666. The Court stated that "[q]uite simply, the government's pursuit of a
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties." Id.
110.
Id. The Court stated that public ownership is not the only way to achieve a public
purpose. Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 2667. In his oral argument before the Court, council for petitioners argued for
minimum standards to ensure that a public benefit occurs. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15,
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108). This argument is in line
with that of the dissent for the Connecticut Supreme Court. Id. The minimum standards
could include things such as "a commencement date for the project, a construction schedule,
[and] financial eligibility for the developers ....
Id.
113.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242
(1984)).
114.
Id. at 2668. The Court explained that "[a] constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan
had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful
consummation of many such plans." Id.
115.
Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015 (1984) ("The proper
inquiry before this Court is not whether the provisions in fact will accomplish their stated
objectives. Our review is limited to determining that the purpose is legitimate and that ConPublishedgress
by Law
Archive
of have
Wyoming
Scholarship,
2006 would promote that objective.")). 13
rationally
could
believed
that the provisions
116.
Id. at 2669.
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takings power. Indeed, many States already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline."' 17
JusticeKennedy's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy added that a court should
use rational basis review when determining whether the legislature's taking
is valid under the Public Use Clause." 8 He went on to say that when applying rational basis review in this type of case, a court should only "strike
down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits .
*...""9 He
disagreed with petitioners' contention that any taking for economic development must be per se invalid but reasoned that there may be some instances
in which a private party is shown such acute favoritism that the taking is
unacceptable.2 ° Kelo did not demand a higher level of scrutiny, and Justice
Kennedy declined to describe the type of economic development taking that
would trigger such scrutiny.12'

Justice 0 'Connor'sDissent
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor scathingly wrote:
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private
property render economic development takings "for public
use" is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property-and thereby effectively to delete the
words "for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
22
Amendment. Accordingly I respectfully dissent.1
Justice O'Connor believed that the takings in Kelo were for the benefit of
private developers and, along with Justice Thomas, found it suspicious that
the NLDC's plan coincided so closely with Pfizer's announcement of a new
117. Id. at 2668 (explaining that states have limited eminent domain power in state constitutions and statutes).
118.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119.
Id. 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy reasoned that the public taking
in Kelo is warranted because of testimony of government officials, respondents' awareness of
New London's depressed state, the commitment of funds by the state before any private bene-

ficiaries were known, and the fact that many of the private beneficiaries are still unknown. Id.
at 2669-2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120.
Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
549-550 (1998)). Heightened scrutiny is not triggered just because the purpose of a taking is
economic development. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]his is not the occasion
for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard .
Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
122.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

14

2006

CASE NOTE
Burton: Property Law - Not So Fast: The Supreme Court's Overly Broad Publ

facility.' 23 Justice O'Connor began her analysis of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment by noting that it is a limitation on the government's power
with two restrictions: public use and just compensation.'24 These two restrictions act as a security to land owners who cannot easily protect themselves from those with greater power in the political process.,2 5 Justice
O'Connor agreed that "considerable deference" should be given to legislative decisions involving the Public Use Clause.2 6 However, despite the limited power of the judicial check, it must be instituted if it is to retain any
meaning. 27 Justice O'Connor stated the Court's decision "is an abdication
of our responsibility" to enforce the Federal Constitution. 2 '
Justice O'Connor outlined the three categories of justifiable public
use takings. 29 First, the government may transfer private property to public
ownership for a road, hospital, school or military facility. 3 Second, the
government may transfer property to private parties who will make the property available to the public, such as utility companies and railroads.' 3' Third,
the Court has allowed takings that satisfy a "public purpose" even when the
property taken may be destined for private use.'32 Justice O'Connor stated

123.
Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The City of New London gave the NLDC
initial approval for development only two months after Pfizer's announcement of a new facility to be built in the Fort Trumbull area. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This redevelopment
plan is "suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation." Id. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124.
Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that "[t]ogether
they ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent domain power .. " Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125.
Id. (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
126.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930)
("It is well established that ... the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial one.")).
Justice O'Connor then stated, "[b]ut were the political branches the sole arbiters of the publicprivate distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little more than hortatory fluff."
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128.
Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor agreed that "States play
many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal
to enforce properly the Federal Constitution (and a provision meant to curtail state action, no
less) is not among them." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129.
Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269
U.S. 55 (1925) (allowing the United States to take private land for military facilities); Rindge
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (allowing the state of California to take
private property for the creation of a public highway).
131.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992) (allowing the taking of property for use by a
railroad); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30
(1916) (transferring private water rights to a power company to generate power).
132.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This was true in the two cases
relied
uponArchive
by the majority
opinion:
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that Kelo is the Supreme Court's first case in over twenty years that addresses this ambiguous "public purpose" taking.'3 3
Justice O'Connor distinguished the two cases relied upon by the majority.134 In both Berman and Midkiff, the takings were for a "public purpose" since private property was condemned and transferred to private parties with an incidental benefit for the public. 35 Although Berman and Midkiff equated a public use taking with the government's police power to
eliminate social harm, giving the Kelo Court an added authority to take
property, Justice O'Connor stated that these two propositions may not always be equated. 36
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor contemplated the worrisome future
of eminent domain policy. 37 She expressed concern that developers and
those with influential political power would take advantage of the new definition of "public use"
in order to take property away from those with fewer
38
political resources.

Justice Thomas' Dissent
Justice Thomas agreed with Justice O'Connor's reasoning, but concentrated on the need to revisit the Framer's intended meaning of "public
use" and to defer less to the legislature when determining what constitutes a
"public use."' 39 Justice Thomas stated the text of the Constitution suggests
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984).
133.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134.
1d. at 2673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
135.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136.
Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor distinguished the takings in
Midkiff and Berman from those in Kelo:
[I]n both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating
the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm. Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because
each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the
property was turned over to private use. Here, in contrast, New London
does not claim that Susette Kelo's and Wilhelmina Dery's wellmaintained homes are the source of any social harm.
Id. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137.
Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138.
Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated, "[tihe beneficiaries are likely
to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has
license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
139. Id. at 2678-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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"the Takings Clause authorizes the taking of property only if the public has a
right to employ it, not if the public realizes any conceivable benefit from the
taking."' 4 The Takings Clause is a limitation on legislative power which the
Court should not be able to eliminate. 4'
Justice Thomas suggested a return to the "actual use" test to determine whether a taking is for a public use. 4 2 This test would emphasize the
Framers' intentions that property is a fundamental and natural right and the
government should not be able to come in and take it. 4 3 Justice Thomas
criticized the Kelo Court for its deference to the legislature for such an obviously legal question.'" The Court did not defer to the legislature on questions of reasonable search and seizure in the home, but when the issue was
whether to tear down a home, the Court accepted the judgment of the legislature. 45 Justice Thomas also criticized equating police power with eminent
domain power because, traditionally, police power was used to abate nuisances and did not necessitate compensation. 6 Thus, police power contradicts the takings power which always requires just compensation. ""
Justice Thomas voiced concern about repercussions stemming from
the Court's decision. 4 He argued the government is incapable of providing
140. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J.,dissenting) (stating that "[t]he Framers would
have used some such broader term if they had meant the Public Use Clause to have a...
sweeping scope").
141.
Id. at 2678-79 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court should not be allowed
to "eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution" and the Public Use Clause is
one such limit on the government's eminent domain power).
142.
Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The actual use test is easier to administer because it determines whether the government owns or the public has a right to use the land
being condemned. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In contrast, the public purpose test only
determines whether the taking is purely private or whether it will deliver some sort of public
benefit. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
143.
Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2684 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated, "a court owes no deference to a legislature's judgment concerning the quintessentially legal question of whether the
government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the taken property." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas reasoned that the Court does not defer to the legislature on questions of "when a search of a home would be reasonable" or when "a convicted double murderer may be shackled during a sentencing proceeding" or when "state law creates a property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Framers
would not have intended the Court to defer to the legislature in these situations; therefore, the
Court should not defer to the legislature in the situation at hand. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained, "[tihough
citizens are safe from government in their homes, the homes themselves are not." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
146.
Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
147.
Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded that "[t]he question whether
the State can take property using the power of eminent domain is therefore distinct from the
question whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power." Id. (Thomas, J.,
Publisheddissenting).
by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2006
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compensation that reflects the subjective value of the individual's property
and these economic development-type takings will most likely occur in
poorer 4neighborhoods
unable to make the most profitable use of their prop9
erties.1
Finally, Justice Thomas suggested that
when faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line
of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history,
and structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of the Constitution's
original meaning."'
Thus, Justice Thomas believed that the conflict of principles and original
meaning of the Public Use Clause justified a finding in favor of the Kelo
petitioners.5I
ANALYSIS
In deciding Kelo v. City of New London, the United States Supreme
Court erred by determining that pure economic development constitutes a
public use as defined by the Fifth Amendment. Since its inception, the Public Use Clause has evolved from being narrowly defined to being so broadly
defined the Kelo decision essentially negated the entire clause.' 52 Although
the Court relied on Berman and Midkiff in upholding the decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, its holding relied on language irrelevant to the
specific holdings in those two cases.'53 Where Berman and Midkiffjustified
takings by invoking the government's police power to eliminate a societal
harm, the Kelo Court, as did the Michigan Supreme Court twenty years earlier in Poletown, transferred property from one private citizen to another

149.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court's decision is an opportunity for development
companies with political power to take advantage of the poor who lack this power. Id. at
2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The original meaning of "public
use" is that it must be owned by the government or the public must have a legal right to use it.
Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151.
Id. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152.
Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining the
Kelo Court effectively deleted the words "for public use" from the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment); Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 50 (Winter 2003) (explaining
that the Court in Midkiff read the term "public use" completely out of the Fifth Amendment).
153.
Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated, "the takings in those
cases were within the police power but also for 'public use' . . . . The case before us now
demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking's purpose is constitutional, the police power and
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
'public use' cannot always be equated." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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with little or no benefit to the public. 54 Justices Thomas and O'Connor predicted the cost of such a decision, and these consequences have been realized in the short time since the Kelo decision.'15 In Kelo's wake, various
development plans have failed and many state and federal legislatures have
begun the process to limit the power granted by the United States Supreme
Court.1 6 Thus, several state court cases and the backlash from Kelo are actually spurring a movement to limit the government's eminent domain powers by excluding economic development as a public use.' 57
The Evolution of Public Use
Municipal, state, and federal governments possess the unrelenting
obligation to protect the personal property of individual citizens. 58 Amid
knowledge of the government's responsibility, James Madison proposed the
Public Use Clause to prevent legislatures from forfeiting this obligation in
favor of powerful factions.'59 Despite the duty the Public Use Clause imposes, the government justifies condemning private property for development which confers a private benefit by employing a broad reading of "public use."' 6 ° Transferring property from one private individual to another priId. at 2673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
154.
City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas predicted that
155.
cities would rush to condemn the land of the poor in favor of the politically wealthy. Id.
Justice O'Connor contended that "[a]ny property may now be taken for the benefit of another
private party ..... Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In their Petition for Rehearing,
Petitioners listed sixteen cities that began or continued their abuse of eminent domain for
private development as a result of the Court's decision in Kelo. Petition for Rehearing at 1-8,
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
156.
See Eric Heisler, Ruling has Unexpected Effect here-it Stalls Projects, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 2005, at BI (stating that "[i]nstead of running rampant, the use of
condemnation has stalled"); Law Tribune Advisory Board, Limit Eminent Domain Authority,
CONNECTICUT LAW TRiBUNE, Aug. 22, 2005, at 17 (stating that the Kelo decision has led to
backlash against eminent domain); Matt Welch, The Left's Eyeing your Home, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at M6 ("Legislators in 28 states have made at least preliminary noises
about restricting the practice, with Alabama being first to enact a new law.").
157.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 50-51 (listing various efforts that have raised public
interest about the opposition of eminent domain). See also Sandefur, supra note 86, at 678
(stating that overruling Poletown is a step in the right direction for reform).
158.
Steven E. Buckingham, The Kelo Threshold: PrivateProperty and Public Use Reconsidered, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1294 (May 2005). Buckingham argued that the "government's obligation with respect to the protection of private property is not discretionary; it is
obligatory." Id.
159.
Michael J. Coughlin, Absolute Deference Leads to UnconstitutionalGovernance: The
Need for A New Public Use Rule, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 1001, 1005-06 (2005) ("Madison
feared that powerful factions interested in the acquisition of more property would influence
the legislatures for their own benefit at the expense of the less powerful, and proposed the
Public Use Clause in part to control the effects of the factions' influence.").
Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, Municipalization, and the Dormant Commerce
160.
Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1505, 1517 (June 2005). Saxer explained that "[c]ondemning
benefits private interests, requires a broad
development,
which2006
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vate individual is not a novel concept. 6 ' However, early courts did not allow the use of eminent domain to transfer land for
private use and correctly
62
narrowly.
very
use"
"public
of
scope
the
defined
Transfers of land to private entities using eminent domain began
with the industrial revolution and the desire for economic expansion.'6 3
These condemnations were acceptable under the proper reading of the Takings Clause in which eminent domain is only authorized if the public has a
"right to employ" the condemned land. 6' Even though many private contractors carried out the construction of railroads, highways, and dams, these
takings were justified as public uses because they conferred a direct benefit
on, and were open to, the general public. 65 Takings for "general public utility" were not "terribly controversial" because of their availability for use by
the public. 66 Although eminent domain at this time could be used for "matters of public necessity," transferring property from one private citizen to
another was "constitutionally inconceivable.' 6 7

161.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 2. Pritchett stated that "[flor two centuries, local, state,
and federal governments have used eminent domain in pursuit of public policy goals, often at
the expense of the individual property owner but also to the benefit of purely private interests." Id.
162.
See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 658 (1829) (stating that taking property from
A to give to B is inconsistent with just principles and is resisted in every jurisdiction where it
is attempted to be enforced); Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 339 (1877) (stating that eminent domain could only be used by private corporations for extreme necessity); Claeys, supra
note 34, at 878, 902-04 (stating that "[a] use was public only if the public used the property"
and that courts in the nineteenth century did not allow the transfer of private property from
one citizen to another unless it was in the context of a governmental use or common carrier).
163.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 9-10.
164.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas suggested that
"[t]he Constitution's text, in short, suggests that the Takings Clause authorizes the taking of
property only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public realizes any conceivable
benefit from the taking." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165.
Id. See also Sandefur, supra note 86, at 656-57 (stating that courts rationalized railroads as a public use because they were so highly regulated by the government and, in a
sense, constituted a government enterprise); Claeys, supra note 34, at 902-03 ("The public's
right of access [to common carriers] ensured that the public 'uses' the property, even though a
private delegate happened to own the property.").
166.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1281.
167.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1297. Buckingham explained,
In the original estimation of the Supreme Court, then, it is clear that the
proper exercises of eminent domain were to be confined to urgent matters
of public necessity .... With respect to takings of private property in
which the property seized was to be subsequently transferred to another
private citizen, however, the Court found this constitutionally inconceivable.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
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The twentieth century allowed for additional broadening of the term
"public use" into the modem day definition of "public purpose.' 16' That
century watched as the "government began to employ eminent domain for
purposes whose public utility was strained, if not tenuous." '69 One scholar
defined public purpose as "that of public utility, public interest, common
benefit, general advantage or convenience, or that still more indefinite term
public improvement .... 70 With very little analysis, this term has been
used by the Court since 1896 to rationalize takings that confer direct benefits
on private parties with only incidental benefits to the public. 7' The increasingly blurred line between what constituted a private use verses a public
purpose set the stage for Berman's economic development condemnation in
1954.172

The Move TowardPure Economic Takings
Berman set the pace for all eminent domain cases seeking to transfer
private property to private users in the second half of the twentieth century. 7 It merged an incredibly broad definition of public use with complete
legislative deference and upheld the taking of unblighted property. 74 This
decision was not surprising because it followed the New Deal principle that
legislatures, not courts, were to make policies regarding economic regulations.'75 After Berman, private property was no longer safe from condemnation unless no public utility was realized by its taking. 176 Midkiff affirmed
Berman which left very little room for the Court to decide what qualified as
Claeys, supra note 34, at 905.
168.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1281.
169.
170.
Claeys, supra note 34, at 905 (asking whether this definition confers any limits on
legislatures).
dissenting). Two lines of cases, those
171.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2682-83 (Thomas, J.,
adopting "public purpose" and those deferring to the legislature, merged to form the "boundlessly broad and deferential conception of 'public use' adopted by this Court .... Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (upholding an act allowing the distribution of water among landowners because it served a "public
purpose").
172.
Sandefur, supra note 86, at 659-60 ("[T]he 1950s cases which held that the concept of
public use allowed government to redistribute property to private parties for private profiton the grounds that such profit had beneficial social consequences-were based on the gradual erosion of the division between public and private.").
Claeys, supra note 34, at 907-08 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-29
173.
(1984)). Both Midkiff and the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kelo agreed with the broad
definition of public use and deference to the legislature. Id. at 908.
Id. at 881 (suggesting that nothing regarding public use requires that the "law be so
174.
dissenting).
evolving, elastic, or deferential"). See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2682 (Thomas, J.,
175.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 46. Pritchett explained that "[b]y the time Berman was
argued, the Court had a more than twenty-year record of restraint in considering such measures." Id.
176.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1302. Buckingham stated that after Berman, "the
private estate of an individual was no longer 'holy,' 'sacred,' or 'invoidable' . . . rather, BerPublishedman
by established
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public use.'77 Due to the legislature's boundless eminent domain power and
its potential effects on all American landowners, all eyes were on the Kelo
Court to return the Public Use Clause to its original meaning. 7 ' Although
the Kelo Court affirmed Berman and Midkiff, it should have found the economic development justification to be without reasonable foundation, because the Kelo takings did not invoke the State's police power or immediately eliminate a social harm. 79
Midkiff and Berman transferred property to private individuals but
did so by invoking the state's police powers. 8 ° Both of these cases upheld
acts that delivered direct and immediate public benefits and never discussed
the possibility that private land could be taken in furtherance of pure economic development such as that in Kelo.'8 The takings in Berman eradicated a blighted neighborhood and those in Midkiff abolished an extremely
vexing oligopoly. 8 Where these cases involved economic development
177.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (stating that a Court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature unless the legislature's judgment is without "reasonable foundation").
178.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1282. Buckingham explained that "[b]ecause of the
extensive scope of the modem governmental authority to exercise eminent domain, Kelo's
importance touches every American landowner. Because of the relationships implicatedthose among individuals, their property, and their govemment-Kelo concerns nothing less
than the foundational principles of our Republic." Id.
179.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. in Support
of Petitioners at 15-21, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108)
(stating that the Court's precedents do not support the taking of property for "generalized
economic development" found in Kelo because the precedents invoked classic usage of a
state's police power and the takings conferred an immediate and direct public benefit).
180.
Id. at 18 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) ("The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health,
safety, and morals.")).
181.
Id. In their brief to the Court, the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. stated,
Like any building project, the project here would create construction jobs,
but surely that alone cannot be a sufficient basis for a public use; if it
were, any condemnation could be justified so long as it contemplated new
construction. Likewise, new jobs and increased tax revenues, such as
those expected to result here, follow any corporate relocation to a new
area.
Id.
182. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In regards to Berman and
Midkiff, Justice O'Connor stated,
[Tihe extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting
from extreme poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found
that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the
harm.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
Id. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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resultingfrom the removal of societal harms, Kelo endorsed pure economic
development without purporting to eliminate a social harm.8 3 Although
Midkiff and Berman "endorsed government intervention when private property use had veered to such an extreme that the public was suffering as a
consequence," the private property use in Kelo did not cause public suffering. '" There is little question that legislatures have the power to enact laws
to improve economic conditions, but before Kelo, the Court had never upheld a taking for generalized public use.8 5 Indeed, "any boon for Pfizer or
the plan's developer is difficult to disaggregate from the promised public
gains in taxes and jobs."'86
In order to retain its power as a judicial check, the Court must have
some authority to determine when the legislature has violated the Public Use
Clause.8 7 There is a specific caveat in Berman and Midkiff prohibiting the
use of eminent domain for purely private uses such as those proposed in
Kelo."' Even with this caveat and an opportunity, if narrow, for the Court to
determine proper public use, the Court upheld the broadened definition of
public purpose and opened the door for any and all property to be taken in
the name of economic development. 8 9

183.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that "[h]ere, in contrast, New
London does not claim that Susette Kelo's and Wilhelmina Dery's well-maintained homes are
the source of any social harm." Id. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
185.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. in Support
of Petitioners at 18-20, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
The brief stated that "[t]his Court has never held that the mere promise of a business relocation alone justifies a taking." Id. at 18. However, "[t]he public benefits at issue here-which
are not only speculative but are also attenuated in time from the taking of property-are in
stark contrast to the public benefits resulting from the takings in Midkiff and Berman." Id. at
19.
186.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2675-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187.
Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446
(1930) (stating that the question of what is a public use is for the judiciary)).
188.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112, at 9-10 (stating that what is at issue
here is that eminent domain cannot be used for private purposes and the caveat in Berman and
Midkiffprohibits eminent domain for private use).
189.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor concluded,
[Tihe Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It
holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as
the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic
pleasure.
Id. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
See Haw.
Housing 2006
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) 23
Published
by Law Archive
of Wyoming
Scholarship,
("A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement.").

278

WYOMING LAW REVIEW
Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 6 [2006], No. 1, Art. 9

Vol. 6

The Kelo Court Should Have Followed Michigan's Lead
When deciding Kelo, the United States Supreme Court was armed
with the knowledge that at least one state had unanimously and recently rejected the taking of private property for economic development."' In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court exponentially broadened the "public use"
clause of the Fifth Amendment, taking it to the conceivable limits of what
possibly constituted a public purpose. 9 ' With County of Wayne, Michigan
brought the "public use" clause back from the edge of destruction and overruled Poletown at a time when Kelo was making its way to the Supreme
Court.

192

Kelo and Poletown were factually very similar: Both cases involved
state legislative acts giving private entities the use of eminent domain to
transfer property for private use; both Acts used economic development and
growth as the sole justification of public use; the issue in each case was
whether the taking conferred a public or a private benefit; both rulings upheld state statutes that conferred a private benefit with only incidental benefits to a small part of the public; and both decisions relied on Berman in refusing to limit the legislature's ability to react to economic problems by using eminent domain. 93 Kelo and Poletown reduced the public use require-

190.
See Sandefur, supra note 86, at 651-52.
Id.at660-61.
191.
192.
See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (2004); Sandefur, supra
note 86, at 651-52. It is timely to discuss eminent domain when Poletown, a famous taking
case, has just been overruled and the United States Supreme Court is currently considering the
subject in Kelo. Sandefur, supra note 86, at 651-52. Overruling Poletown "sends a clear
message to other courts that the abuse of eminent domain must be stopped, and that the govemnment's powers to seize property must be limited by effective constitutional restraints." Id.
at 65 1.
193.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005); Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). See also Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.1601 (1979) (authorizing condemnation by municipalities to provide industrial and commercial sites with ultimate transfer to private entities);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193 (2004) (authorizing the NLDC, a non-profit, private development
entity, to use eminent domain in the name of the City). Due to the projected increase in jobs
and increased tax base, the Kelo Court determined that the development plan would provide
"appreciable benefits" to the public. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2665. The Court stated that the plan
"unquestionably serves a public purpose .
I..."
Id. The purpose of the Act in Poletown was
to condemn property to create an industrial site used to alleviate unemployment and economic
problems. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458. The issue was whether the proposed condemnation
conferred a private benefit or was considered a public use. Id. By upholding these statutes,
the courts in Kelo and Poletown authorize an incidental benefit on the public. See Kelo, 125
dissenting) (stating that the Court's decision made it possible for
S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J.,
the use of eminent domain to transfer property to a private use as long as there is some sort of
dissenting) (stating that
secondary public use); Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 462 (Fitzgerald, J.,
the economic benefits of GM's use of the property are incidental to the private benefit). Each
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
court relied heavily on Berman to justify economic development as a public use. See Kelo,
125 S.Ct. at 2663; Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
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ment and gave the government the power of "public choice."' 94 The government's choice was whether to use eminent domain to benefit developers
Unfortunately, wealthy corporaor to protect small private homeowners.'
to lobby the government and influence its
tions are in a better position
"choice" in their favor. 9 6 These choices are inherently unfair since the Public Use Clause was intended to protect all property owners regardless of their
political influence.' 97
The overarching difference between Poletown and Kelo is that the
Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletownjust one year before the United
States Supreme Court reviewed Kelo."' County of Wayne v. Hathcock
raised public awareness and alerted courts and legislatures to review their
application of the Public Use Clause after years of relying on Berman.'"
Where courts previously had shown judicial restraint in upholding legislative
acts involving public use, County of Wayne declared takings under the guise
of economic development unavailable to the government. 2'
County of
Wayne made it "respectable again for federal and state supreme courts to try
to recover the original meanings of their constitutions' public-use limitations."2" ' Unfortunately, the Kelo Court was not persuaded by County of
Wayne's lead.2 °2
The Kelo Court had the opportunity to return the public use clause to
its original meaning and restore the fundamental right of property to all
Americans." 3 Instead, the Court abdicated its "responsibility to protect
194. Sandefur, supra note 86, at 661. Sandefur explained that "[g]utting the public use
clause leads to what economists call the 'public choice' problem." Id.
195. Id. Sandefur stated that "[w]hen a company like GM can expect tens of millions of
dollars in benefits from the government, it will spend a great deal in its attempt to persuade
the government to act on its behalf." Id.
196. Id. at 662-63. Wealthy corporations generally have more money and political power
than vulnerable groups such as the poor and racial minorities. Id. See also Petition for Rehearing at 7, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (stating that
for poorer individuals the cost of litigation will exceed the value of their property).
197.
Sandefur, supra note 86, at 662 (stating that it is unfair for property to be taken from
one and transferred to another due to political influence).
198.
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (2004) (overruling Poletown
because it is inconsistent with Michigan's jurisprudence and was an invalid reading of its
Constitution).
199. Claeys, supra note 34, at 912. Claeys explained that "Hathcock is a momentous
decision because it reopens many of the questions Berman covered over." Id.
200. Sandefur, supra note 86, at 671.
201.
Claeys, supra note 34, at 913.
202. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005) (affirming Berman and
Midkiff in deferring to the legislature and allowing economic development as a justifiable
public use).
203. Brief of Amici Curiae Better Government Ass'n, Citizen Advocacy Center, DKT
Liberty Project, National Institute for Urban Entrepreneurship, & Office of the Community
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property owners from government abuse," deferred to the state legislature,
and allowed economic development to be validated as a public use. 2M
Abusing Eminent Domain
The decision in Kelo justified and continued the government's already abusive use of eminent domain.0 5 Prior to Kelo, Berman authorized a
broader use of the government's eminent domain powers and eliminated the
rights of individual citizens guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment.2 "6 During the 1950s and 1960s, redevelopment projects displaced over one million
people. 20 7 Today, eminent domain power is used to transfer land to private
individuals "in the name of housing, commercial, or industrial development. 208 From 1993 to 2003, there were over 10,000 cases in the United
2
States of condemnation or threatened condemnation for private profit. 211
Over 3700 properties were actually condemned using eminent domain.
Most condemnations for private benefit fall on those who do not have the
income to launch a fight against large corporations. 2 '1 Although the takings
clause requires "just compensation" for its takings, this is little comfort to
204.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 50 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has
eliminated the words "public use" from the Fifth Amendment and criticized the Court's judicial restraint). See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664. The majority allowed states to place further
restrictions on the base-line takings power outlined in Kelo. Id. at 2668. "[M]any States
already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of
these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others
are expressed in state eminent domain statues that carefully limit the grounds upon which
takings may be exercised." Id.
205.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor distinguished
the consequences of Berman and Midkiff from those of Kelo:
It was possible after Berman and Midkiff to imagine unconstitutional
transfers from A to B. Those decisions endorsed government intervention
when private property use had veered to such an extreme that the public
was suffering as a consequence. Today nearly all real property is susceptible to condemnation on the Court's theory.
Id.
206.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 47. The judiciary legitimated takings under the guise of
urban renewal. Id. See Coughlin, supra note 159, at 1024 ("This unconstrained power is
permissible under Berman when, for example, the legislature has decided that its governed
land area 'should be beautiful as well as sanitary."').
207.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 47. Pritchett argued that urban renewal projects of the
1950s and 1960s were disproportionately focused on the displacement of minorities. Id.
208.
Id. at 48. Many cities now use "job creation" as the justification for a "public use."
Id.
209.
DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2 (2003).
210.
Id. See Sandefur, supra note 86, at 664 (stating that most Americans lack the funds to
challenge a condemnation).
211.
Sandefur, supra note 86, at 662-63. See also Hands off our Homes: Property Rights
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
and Eminent Domain, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 21 ("Developers who know the
sellers have to sell will surely be tempted to 'lowball' their offers.").
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those forced to move from their lifelong homes or self-made businesses.212
There is no way to capture the subjective value of one's home or business
when measuring compensation.213 People whose properties face condemnation are left with few options since appealing to the judiciary now seems of
little use.2 4
Abuses of the government's eminent domain power are all the more
likely after the decision in Kelo.2" s The Mayor of Washington, D.C. praised
the decision but declared, "[w]e must be sensitive to those who may be displaced. ' 216 With the ruling in Kelo, however, it is obvious that "public purpose" will not be applied by the states in a principled manner. 2 17 In Los Angeles, the city "would not use its powers of eminent domain to force property owners to sell, unless the developers were unable to reach a deal with
the landowners."2 ' In Chicago, former corporation council stated, "[n]ow
that the Supreme Court has said you don't need roads and bridges and muse212.
Brief of Amici Curiae Better Government Ass'n, Citizen Advocacy Center, DKT
Liberty Project, National Institute for Urban Entrepreneurship, & Office of the Community
Lawyer in Support of Petitioners at 11-12, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005) (No. 04-108) (noting the devastating psychological effect on those forced to leave
their homes and the scattering of neighborhood schools, churches and extended families).
213.
Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 21, Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (promoting compensation rules to
ensure individuals do not suffer more than necessary by loosing their homes). See also Kelo,
125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[N]o compensation is possible for the subjective
value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them
from their homes.").
214.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1304. Buckingham explained that "[w]ith great
deference extended to legislatures out of respect for the separation of powers, the individual
property owner is left to face a mountain of adverse presumptions with no assistance from the
judiciary." Id.
215. Kelo. 125 U.S. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under the banner of economic
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another
private owner ... ").
216.
Sherry Conway Appel, Supreme Court Decision in Eminent Domain Case a Victory
for Cities, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 23, 2005, available at http://releases.usnewswire.com
/GeRelease.asp?id=49336 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005). The Washington, D.C. Mayor, Anthony A. Williams, praised eminent domain as a city's most valuable tool and purported to
allow citizen input and discussion when making eminent domain decisions. Id. Washington,
D.C. is currently using eminent domain to redevelop the Skyland Shopping Center which will
create 300 jobs and $3.3 million in new tax revenue. Id.
217.
Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court's application of cases
such as Berman and Midkiff "is further proof that the 'public purpose' standard is not susceptible of principled application." Id. "Today's decision is simply the latest in a string of our
cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its
original meaning." Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Petition for Rehearing at i,
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (stating that since the
ruling in Kelo, local governments have abused their power with little constraint on their eminent domain abilities).
218.
Matt Welch, The Left's Eyeing Your Home, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at
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urns [to justify taking property], you can do it to 'revitalize' areas, it makes
the job of many government lawyers easier in many instances."219 Although
some scholars argued that the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari indicated a
willingness within the Court to "set forth a new principle limiting the scope
of legitimate governmental condemnations," Kelo broadened public use so
that "no homeowner's, merchant's or manufacturer's property, however productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation for the benefit of other private interest that will put it to a 'higher' use."22 In the three
weeks after the Court ruled on Kelo, small companies and homes were taken
for more upscale businesses and shopping malls, and many other development plans using eminent domain were initiated.22t These occurrences are
the result of the Court's unwillingness to enforce the Public Use Clause and
its reliance on States to choose what constitutes a public use.222
The SurprisingResult ofKelo
Prior to Kelo, County of Wayne and various anti-eminent domain efforts had raised public awareness of, and created political opposition to, recent urban renewal programs. 223
Although many initially thought of Kelo
as a fleecing of Americans' property rights, the overwhelming backlash from
the Court's decision has raised awareness and created a movement to limit
the government's use of eminent domain.224 Public support for limitations

219.
Abdon Pallasch, Court Shows Homeowners Door: Development Trumps Property
Rights; Connecticut Municipality Wins in 5-4 decision, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 24, 2005,
at 65.
220.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1309. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221.
Petition for Rehearing at 1-8, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005)
(No. 04-108). The brief lists various takings and plans for condemnation based on the Kelo
ruling. Id. For example, "[t]wo days after the Kelo decision, Boston City Council President
Michael Flaherty called on the mayor of Boston to seize South Boston waterfront property
from unwilling sellers for a private development project." Id. at 3. In Oakland, California,
"[a] week after this Court's ruling in Kelo, Oakland city officials used eminent domain to
evict John Revelli from the downtown tire shop his family has owned since 1949." Id. at 5.
222.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that
"the Court suggests that property owners should turn to the States, who may or may not
choose to impose appropriate limits on economic development takings." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). However, this does not compensate for the Court's refusal to uphold the Constitution. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223.
Pritchett, supra note 152, at 50-51. The Eminent Domain Law Project was established by the Institute for Justice in order to provide legal services to people facing the condemnation of their homes. Id.
224.
Law Tribune Advisory Board, Limit Eminent Domain Authority, CONNECTICUT LAW
TRIBUNE, Aug. 22, 2005, at 17 ("Ironically, the decision, which was initially regarded as a
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9
loss for private property owners, has had the opposite effect: it has led to a backlash against
eminent domain .... ").
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on the government's eminent domain power is high and exists in all demographics and political parties." 5
In its wake, the Kelo opinion has slowed condemnation efforts and
put developers on the defensive.226 Many legislators have vehemently opposed the Kelo decision and called for Congress to initiate legislation to protect private property. 227 The United States Congress has proposed bills to
limit the use of eminent domain for economic development authorized by
Kelo.228 On November 3, 2005, the United States House of Representatives
approved the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, the first federal
legislation passed in response to Kelo.229 States such as Alabama, Nevada,
Texas, and Utah have worked fast to pass bills excluding condemnations by
the government resulting in private benefits.230 Some states have created
task forces to explore the use of possible restrictions on eminent domain.23 '
Gary J. Andres, The Kelo backlash; Americans want limits on Eminent Domain, THE
Sixty-eight percent of registered voters support
limiting government's eminent domain power. Id. This includes "[s]ixty-two percent of selfidentified Democrats, 74 percent of independents and 70 percent of Republicans .... " Id.
226.
See, e.g., Hands off our Homes: Property Rights and Eminent Domain, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 21 (stating that, according to polls, ninety percent of Americans disapprove of the kind of takings allowed under Kelo). See also Michael Gardner, Lawmakers Rethink Land-Seizure Laws, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 17, 2005 (stating that California lawmakers are looking into measures to protect farmland and the use of eminent domain for non-public purposes).
227.
See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Sensenbrenner Introduces Bipartisan Legislation Addressing Last Week's Supreme Court Decision Allowing Government Taking of Private
Property (June 30, 2005) (on file with US FED. NEWS) ("This decision assaults the constitutional rights of all Americans and unsettles decades of judicial precedent."); Rep. Cubin Condemns Supreme Court Land Grab Decision, U.S. FED. NEWS, June 30, 2005 ("Any of our
homes could now be taken by local governments and turned over to corporate developers
under the cover of 'economic growth.' Congress has the ability to address this matter with
legislation, and that is an avenue we must consider in the wake of this decision.").
228.
See Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005, H.R.
3083, 109th Cong. (2005) (defining public use as excluding economic development); S. 1313,
109th Cong. (2005) (proposing a bill to protect homes, small businesses, and other private
property rights, by limiting the power of eminent domain).
229.
Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005) (prohibiting state or political entities from using eminent domain for economic development when
said entity receives federal economic development funding).
230. See S.B. 68, 2005 S., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (enacting a bill limiting the government's eminent domain power to those condemnations that will be of use to the general public); Assemb. B. 143, 2005 Assemb., 73rd Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (amending its eminent
domain statute to establish requirements a redevelopment agency must meet before commencing eminent domain proceedings); S.B. 7B, 2005 S., 79th 2nd Called Sess. (Tex. 2005) (limiting the use of eminent domain to take private property for private uses or economic development); S.B. 184, 56th Leg., 2005 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005) (prohibiting redevelopment
agency from using eminent domain to acquire property except under specific circumstances).
231.
See H. Con. Res. 38A, 2005 H.R., 143rd Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2005) (creating a task
force to "examine and draft appropriate State law that would restrict eminent domain to bona
fide public usage"); Exec. Order 15, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005) (creating
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Other states have proposed legislation to amend their constitutions or eminent domain statutes to put limitations on the government's use of condemnation.232
This backlash has allied conservatives and liberals and has some
people thinking the Kelo Court did them a favor by bringing the issue of
economic development for public use to the forefront.233 With heightened
awareness it seems "the pendulum of public use in many states is swinging
back toward the narrow construction" of the term.234 Although the issue of
eminent domain for private purposes is not new and it is not going away, the
Kelo decision might have been the boost needed to push for greater property

232.
See, e.g., S. Constitutional Amendment 12, 2005-2006 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005)
(proposing a Constitutional amendment defining public use to exclude the taking of owner
occupied property for private use); H.B. 31, 2005 H.R., 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (proposing an amendment to the State Constitution providing that economic development does not
constitute a public purpose); H.R. 87, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ga. 2005) (proposing
an amendment to the State Constitution stating that economic development does not constitute a public use); H.B. 4091, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Il1. 2005) (proposing legislation
that requires takings under eminent domain to be for a "qualified public use"); H. Docket
4663, 184th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005) (proposing amendment to the State Constitution prohibiting eminent domain takings for the purpose of economic development); H.B.
5060, 93rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (prohibiting the use of eminent domain to take
private property for the primary benefit of a private entity); H.B. 123A, 2005 H.R., 1st Spec.
Sess. (Minn. 2005) (prohibiting acquisition by eminent domain for private economic development); Assemb. Con. Res. 256, 211 th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005) (proposing a constitutional amendment to limit the use of condemnation to traditional public purposes); S.B. 5936,
228th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (allowing the use of eminent domain for economic
development only when the area is blighted); S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2005) (establishing a moratorium on use of eminent domain by the government to take without owner's consent, unblighted private property for use in economic development); H.B.
2426, 104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005) (prohibiting use of eminent domain for
sole purpose of enhancement of tax revenues or economic development).
233.
Eric Heisler, Ruling has Unexpected Effect Here-it Stalls Projects, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 28, 2005, at BI (stating that the backlash from Kelo is worrying developers
and has stalled many projects in St. Louis). With Kelo, conservatives and liberals have something to agree on. Lisa Sandberg, Senate OKs Bill to Protect PrivateProperty, SAN ANTONIO
ExpREss-NEws, Aug. 10, 2005, at lB. Conservatives view Kelo as an attack on property
rights and liberals view Kelo as a target against minority groups. Id. After the Kelo decision,
many voiced surprise at the Court's split. Dane Roberts, Ruling has Curious Split, DAILY
LOBO,
Aug. 30, 2005, available at http://www.dailylobo.com/media/paper344/
news/2005/08/30/Opinion/Column.Ruling.Has.Curious.Twist-971774.shtml (last visited Nov.
19, 2005). Where as one might imagine that the conservative justices voted in favor of economic development and helping corporations, in actuality the conservative justices voted in
the minority in favor of property rights. Id.
234.
Buckingham, supra note 158, at 1305.
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protection.235 After years of broadening and intrusive uses of eminent do236
main, it seems likely that "this 'Kelo' may have broken the camel's back.
CONCLUSION

When the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, it permitted the
legislature to use eminent domain under the guise of public use when there
were minimal benefits to the general public. The Public Use Clause has
evolved from being narrowly defined to being so broadly defined that it essentially negates the entire clause. The precedents relied upon by Kelo did
not justify such a broad reading of public use because, unlike the City of
New London, Berman and Midkiff used eminent domain in relation to traditional police powers. Kelo violated the property rights the government is
meant to protect and gave the government nearly unlimited freedom of condemnation. Despite adverse consequences resulting from Kelo, the decision
ultimately created enough backlash to spur a movement to protect private
property rights and limit the government's use of eminent domain.
HALEY

W. BURTON

235.
Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-Kelo Wave of Legislation, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 3, 2005, at 4 ("Just five weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of eminent
domain to seize private property for economic development, more than half of the states have
introduced legislation to thwart potential abuses.").
Published
by Law
Archive
of Wyoming
Scholarship,
2006 want Limits on Eminent Domain, THE31
236.
Gary
J. Andres,
The Kelo Backlash;
Americans
WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A21.

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 6 [2006], No. 1, Art. 9

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol6/iss1/9

32

